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Emergent Coopetition from a Sensemaking Perspective: A Multi-Level Analysis 
 
 
Highlights 
 
x This study explores the emergence of coopetition in a complex innovation network 
context 
x The findings offer a rare empirical exposition of the impact of history on coopetitive 
exploitation 
x With a multi-level approach, the case study exposes the navigation of coopetitive tensions 
stemming from the historic development of the coopetitive norms 
x Companies that possess a coopetitive mindset from their conception are distinct from 
those that only develop a coopetitive mindset after their conception 
x Adopting a narrative and visual process mapping approach, we also reveal the impact of 
time on coopetitive interactions 
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ABSTRACT 
This article considers the development of coopetitive sensemaking across multiple levels of 
analysis, which include individual (micro), organizational/inter-organizational (meso), and 
network/ecosystem (macro). Using a sensemaking approach, a series of proposed phases are 
posited in a processual model using teleological assumptions of time to expose coopetition as 
an emergent concept. With a coopetitive mindset as an important focus at the individual level 
of analysis, the processual model inculcates notions of competitive uncertainty, being born 
coopetitive, coopetitive exploration, exploitation, and a coopetitive uncertainty phase. Using 
different pathways through these phases, sensemaking modes are proposed, which include 
network and ecosystem sensitivity. The central contribution of the article is to expose the 
interplay of sensemaking across multiple levels of analysis and across teleological phases. 
Keywords: Coopetitive mindset; coopetitive tensions; network; ecosystem; innovation. 
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Emergent Coopetition from a Sensemaking Perspective: A Multi-Level Analysis 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article presents a conceptualization of multi-level emergent coopetition from a 
sensemaking perspective. In recent years, coopetition has become the subject of very 
significant discussion. For example, three special issues of Industrial Marketing Management 
focus on this subject (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Bengtsson et al., 2016; Le Roy & Czakon, 
2016) and a double special issue in International Studies in Management and Organization 
under the guest editorship of Le Roy et al. (2016). A dominant perspective is dyadic and 
simultaneous (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999), often favoured particularly in studies of high-
technology sectors (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). A somewhat more neglected perspective is 
contextual (Bengtsson et al., 2010) and grounded in Brandenburger and Nalebuff¶s (1996) 
value net and the interdependencies among different groups of networked actors. It is to this 
later perspective that a contribution is furthered in this article.  
Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b, p. 98) recently comment WKDW³Foopetition can be 
approached as a strategic change that consequently triggers sensemaking processes in order to 
UHDFKDVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWHQDEOHVDFWLRQVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQV´ Studies of how coopetitive 
arrangements function rarely explore how they came into being (Tidström & Hagberg-
Andersson, 2012; Tidström & Rajala, 2016). Dahl (2014, p. 272) pointedly notes to the lack of 
³UHVHDUFKJRLQJEH\RQGWKHPRWLYHVEHKLQG[simultaneous] inter-competitor cooperation and 
explaining coopetitive interactions from a process perspective as the relationship unfolds over 
time.´Dahl also emphasizes the importance of the past for understanding coopetition, because 
³FRPSHWLWRUV PXWXDOO\ VWRUH DQG OHDUQ IURP H[SHULHQFHV FUHDWHG ZKLOH FRRSHUDWLQJ DQG
competing with each other.´ A key contribution in this article is to take an individual level 
focus, but to further consider how sensemaking and sensegiving plays out at different levels of 
analysis, and therefore how a coopetitive mindset (Gnyawali & Park, 2009) emerges from the 
sensemaking of individuals in a multi-layered context (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). 
To explore the emergence of coopetitive sensemaking, we explore five cases of science-based 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that share a complex innovation network, or 
innovative ecosystem.  
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We undertake a processual analysis to expose the motion flow of emergent sensemaking in 
a coopetitive situation (Andersen & Medlin, 2016). Rather than adopting the rather narrow, 
linear assumptions of lifecycle model analysis (after Khan & Nicholson, 2014), we proceede 
under teleological assumptions underpinned by the principle of equifinality (Von Bertalanffy, 
1968)²that several paths may be taken between any two points in time. Accordingly, we 
consider the impact of time µon¶ coopetition rather than the coopetitive interaction µover¶ time.  
To establish the conceptual framing, we first outline the two main bodies of thought on 
coopetition before briefly reviewing how sensemaking can be a useful perspective when trying 
to understand the emergent properties of coopetition. We then show how emergence and 
sensemaking can play out at different levels of analysis. Next, we outline our methodology and 
explain how we study coopetition from an emergent, process perspective. The presentation of 
the findings features both narrative and visual process mapping approaches to the processual 
data. Finally, we highlight the main contributions of this study, its limitations, and some 
potential areas for further study. 
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. Approaches to the Study of Coopetition 
Coopetition has been argued to represent a new paradigm that encapsulates the strategic 
management of tensions among simultaneous, interfirm forms of collaboration and 
competition. The related VWUDWHJLHV WKHUHIRUH FRQWDLQ ³FRQWUDGLFWRU\ ORJLFV RI LQWHUDFWLRQ´
(Raza-Ullah et al., 2014, p. 190) and involve the strategic management of opposing 
(competition and collaboration) forces between multiple companies (Fernandez et al., 2014). 
According to one extant perspective, coopetition entails simultaneous collaboration between 
two companies (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999) such that it occurs at a dyadic level, for example, 
when two competitors cooperate within a strategic alliance for new product development whilst 
competing against each other in the marketing of that product (Kylänen & Rusko, 2011). Most 
articles adopt this perspective, especially when they study high-technology sectors (Gnyawali 
& Park, 2011). Studies in this tradition prioritize the process by which cooperation and 
competition shift in relative strength and influence at different points in time (Bengtsson et al., 
2010).  
A second perspective instead defines coopetition contextually, with studies that:  
³«tend to describe the competitive and cooperative part of the relationship as 
divided between actors; that is, a firm in a certain context can have some 
cooperative and some competitive relationships with other firms in this context, 
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which, when combined, give rise to a ³coopetitive situation, not a coopetitive 
LQWHUDFWLRQ´Bengtsson et al., 2010, p. 199). 
 This contextual definition of coopetition is broader than the simultaneous perspective; it 
also encompasses a value net of multiple actors (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
Interactions in these value nets involve customers, suppliers, complementors, and competitors, 
which implies the potential for dyadic, triadic and network interactions (Gnyawali et. al., 2006; 
Pathak et al., 2014; Yami & Nemeh, 2014). The value net contains multiple, direct and indirect, 
horizontal and vertical interactions. Because this contextual perspective considers 
environmental interactions, it predicts that specific sets of competitive and cooperative 
relationships and interdependences influence the perceptions of individuals, groups, or 
organizations. Therefore, these entities engage in coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2010). 
2.2. Emergent Coopetition and Sensemaking 
Emergent coopetition has been considered as unplanned competition in a cooperative settings 
(Czakon, 2010). In most conceptualizations, µemergence¶ marks a simple contraposition to 
µdeliberate¶ coopetition. Most research focuses on deliberate coopetitive strategies, designating 
the emergent strategies as the first stage of a coopetitive process (Mariani, 2007). Tidström and 
Rajala (2016) for instance note a series of stages and identify a pre-coopetition phase and later 
stages, such as silent, active, and forced coopetition phases. However, lifecycle models have 
been identified as rather linear, unidirectional, and predictable (Bengtsson et al., 2010). Such 
exposition has, in our view, focussed on the ³FRQWLQXRXVO\ HYROYLQJLQVWUHQJWKDQGEDODQFH´
(Dahl, 2014, p. 273) between competition and collaboration, but less so on the cognition and 
actions taken by actors engaged in strategizing in these coopetitive arrangements. We propose 
that this distinction pertains to the difference between expositions of a coopetition µover¶ time 
and expositions of the impact of time µon¶ a coopetitive context, and on those involved in it. 
Put another way, existing insight is limited in not allowing for an understanding of how actors 
make sense of an emerging process of change.  
A sensemaking approach has been argued to make the link between cognition, action, and 
outcome (Abrahamsen et al.; 2012; Medlin & Törnroos, 2014). A key element of studying 
emergence is to look for features that could not have been anticipated by individuals with 
reference to preceding events (Garud et al., 2015). We therefore seek to understand how agents 
collectively and individually make sense of a coopetitive interaction as it emerges (after 
Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016 a, b) and this marks a more nuanced approach to 
emergence as can be gleaned when considering emergence as a simple contraposition to 
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deliberateness. Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016 a) also speak of the iterative cycle of 
sensemaking and sensegiving, where a cognitive orientation towards coopetition is derived and 
transmitted. We posit that there is much left to learn about this itertaive process and, in 
particular, how it plays out at different levels of analysis. We draw on two specific aspects of 
sensemaking in our study, the principle of seperation in managing coopetitive pradoxes and the 
identification of benefits in coopetitive arrangements.  
First, the principle of separation (Fernandez et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2014) notes that any 
given person may find it difficult to internalize and manage the simultaneous experiencing of 
coopetition and cooperation, whereas different individuals in the same organizations may do 
so more successfully if the facets of competition and collaboration are separated. The ability to 
internalize and manage such tensions may be a basic principle of ambidexterity (Yang et al., 
2014), and we suggest such ambidexterity is an important facet of individual sensemaking. 
Therefore, because coopetitive paradoxes materialize at various levels²individual, industrial, 
network, relational, and company-specific (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014)²we seek to understand 
how coopetition emerges at different levels. 
The second aspect of sensemaking in coopetition is the retrospective and projective 
assessment of benefits accrued. In addition to mutual benefits accrued through collaboration, 
Rai (2013) notes privately accrued value creation in interfirm alliances. Two discreet sources 
of value fall outside the boundaries of a simultaneous coopetitive interaction, which Rai (2013) 
refers to as private competitive benefits and private collaborative benefits. More recently, 
Volschenk et al. (2016) call for the consideration of socio-economic (public) benefits that 
accrue due to coopetition. A contextual perspective demands consideration of all elements 
(collaborative mutual benefit, private competitive benefits, private collaborative benefits, and 
public coopetitive benefits). An understanding of how these different value types emerge over 
time represents an urgent research priority in the coopetition literature. In particular, the notion 
of intertemporal coopetition (Ansari et al., 2016)²the expectation of commitments made in 
the present in expectation of future benefits²needs further investigation, However, like Garud 
et al. (2015), we are compelled to consider the emergence of such value at different levels of 
analysis. We next turn to the subject of multi-level coopetition.  
2.3. Emergence and Levels of Analysis  
At the head of this section we aligned ourselves with the µcontextual¶ perspective on 
coopetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) and in the preceding section, we stated our 
interest in understanding the emergence of coopetition from a sensemaking perspective. We 
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suggest that the contextual perspective demands consideration of multiple levels of analysis. 
Emergence also has been argued to occur at multiple levels of analysis (Bengtsson et al., 2010). 
Tidström and Rajala (2016, p. 36) SURSRVH WKDW ³Irom a multilevel perspective, coopetition 
strategy can be related to individual, organizational, inter-organizational and network levels,´
and they associate these ideas with micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis. A key issue 
when exploring emergence is that agents may not be aware of forces compelling them due to 
their existence in or between different levels of analysis. Bengtsson and Kock (2014, p. 184) 
recently suggest that: 
³$PXOtilevel approach might provide a richer and more complete understanding 
on coopetition by explaining how the phenomenon at one level of analysis affects 
WKHRWKHUV´ 
The overwhelming dominance in coopetition studies, quite understandably, at an inter-
organizational level, is akin to a meso-level (and simultaneous) consideration (Bengtsson & 
Kock, 1999), often favored in studies of high-technology sectors (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). The 
contextual perspective on coopetition that we favour in this study instead arguably encompasses 
more macro-level contexts such as networks (Rusko, 2014; Velu, 2016) and the more 
contemporary and underexplored concept of ecosystems (Ansari et al., 2016; Ritala et al., 
2014). The ecosystem concept would seem to be of increasing importance in high-tech sectors 
where coopetition is conducted around digital platforms where direct relationships may not 
exist between key complementors. Ansari et al. (2016, p. 1831) note that: 
³7KHWask of managing such coopetitive relationships is all the more challenging in 
V\VWHPLFLQGXVWULHVZLWKPXOWLVLGHGSODWIRUPVDQGFRPSOH[HFRV\VWHPV´  
The iterative process of sensemaking and sensegiving may flow from one network or 
ecosystem actor to another, but there is little help in current literature on which to build an 
understanding. Dahl (2014, p. 272) points to the interplay between inter-organizational and 
external factors in sensemaking when she states:  
³How and why do cooperative interactions between competitors change as the 
competitors acquire new experiences from mutual cooperation, and their external 
environment changes?´ 
To understand the iterative sensemaking processes would seem to require a deeper 
understanding of the individual-level of analysis in coopetition, a level that is sorely 
underrepresented in either the simultaneous or contextual perspectives. The mindset concept 
was introduced into the coopetition literature by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997). 
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Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b) speak of a coopetitive mindset, and this would seem 
to be an essential starting point in undertaking micro-level analysis at the level of the individual 
sensemaking. Gnyawali and Park (2009, p. 323) suggest that: 
³)LUPVOHGE\H[HFXWLYHVZLWKDco-opetition mindset are more likely to perceive 
coopetition opportunities and help other managers develop a co-opetition mindset 
and therefore more effectively manage the dynamics of co-RSHWLWLRQ´ 
A coopetitive mindset may influence when and how companies engage in coopetition, and 
this mindset appears to be a facet of individuals and organizations. We see little study of how 
a coopetitive mindset emergences from individual sensemaking and indeed how a coopetitive 
mindset permeates through organization, network or ecosystem through a process of 
sensegiving. Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016 a, p. 184) note that investigations have not 
³PRYHGGRZQZDUGWRORZHUOHYHOVLQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHGD\-to-day activities 
and challenges of middle managers in particular.´Garud et al. (2015) also emphasize the actions 
taken at the level of the individual may play out at more macro levels. For instance, the principle 
of separation and the perceptions of benefits would seem to need to be understood at a micro-
level before being traced up to their meso and macro-level effects. Each individual, however, 
has a contextual understanding of different levels of the coopetitive context and we consider in 
this article, organization (and inter-organizational), network, and ecosystem levels. 
We thus propose next to outline a process methodology for investigating emergent 
coopetition from a sensemaking perspective and we do so from multiple levels of analysis 
which include individual, organizational, network, and ecosystem. By focusing on individuals 
in our analysis, we expose how the process of sensemaking and sensegiving permeate through 
different levels.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Process Theorizing and Conceptual Framework  
We adopt the definition of process by Pettigrew (1997, p. 338) as a ³VHTXHQFHRILQGLYLGXDO
and collective events, actions, and activities unfolding over time in context.´ Guided by 
Langley (1999), we apply narrative, temporal bracketing, and visual process mapping 
approaches to identify stages of the process (see also Makkonen et al., 2012). With our initial 
research questions, we sought to investigate communities of practice, using retrospective 
accounts of respondents as evidence (Golden, 1992, 1997). In an initial pass, free coding 
identified several themes related to coopetition; that is, coopetition emerged as a theme from 
the transcripts but was not a specific focus of the interview protocols. For the second pass, the 
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interviews were recoded to identify concepts related to coopetition, which included many 
allusions to processes. Therefore, in the third pass, we applied a broadly defined temporal 
bracketing to identify phases of emergent coopetition, as depicted in Figure 1, which is thus 
derived both empirically and conceptually. 
 
Pre 
coopetitive 
state 
Early 
coopetitive 
state
Functioning 
coopetitive 
state
Post 
coopetitive 
state
Teleological time and process
Le
v
e
ls
 o
f 
a
n
a
ly
si
s
Past Future
Emergent coopetition and sensemaking
Micro
Macro
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
Using Figure 1 as a template and a narrative theorizing approach, we present actual quotes 
from respondents that relate to the tentative phases. We conducted additional documentary 
analyses of the companies, too: reviewing news articles, scientific literature, promotional 
material, and each company¶s website. Accordingly, we developed the summative process map 
that we present subsequently in Figure 2. Furthermore, we acknowledge criticisms of lifecycle 
models as too static and deterministic, such that they do not allow for teleological emergence 
(Khan & Nicholson, 2014). Thus, with our processual analysis, we attempt to inculcate the 
notion of equifinality (Von Bertalanffy, 1968) to recognize the potential for different routes to 
an undefined point in the future. 
Our visual process map (Figure 2) accordingly is based on the teleological underlying 
assumptions (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) and represents a summative account of our findings. 
This combination of techniques challenges some dominant assumptions in coopetition 
literature; it also reveals the motion and flow of coopetition (Andersen & Medlin, 2016) as an 
emergent phenomenon.  
3.2. Methodological Procedures  
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The research presented in this article relies on a qualitative, multiple-case study methodology 
(Yin, 2013), which is appropriate because we study complex phenomena in a specific context 
(Baxter et al., 2008). An interpretive approach can help us understand the meanings and 
nuances associated with the experiences of the actors involved (Hopkinson, 2015; Stake, 2013); 
it reflects a social constructionist epistemology in relation to time and process (Järvensivu & 
Törnroos, 2010, Tidström & Hagberg-Andersson, 2012). We conceive of time as socially 
constructed, and we define TXDOLW\³LQ WHUPVRI WKHSODXVLELOLW\RI WKHVWRU\DQG WKHRYHUDOO
DUJXPHQW´ (Myers, 2013, p. 78). We used a purposive sampling criterion (Palys, 2008) to 
recruit the 16 participants for this research (Table 1), each of whom worked for one of the five 
science-based SMEs (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Participants 
Company Participants  Gender Years with 
Company 
Role in the Company 
MediTest Managing Director  
 
Technical Manager  
 
R&D Manager  
R&D Scientist 
R&D Technician 
Male 
 
Male  
 
Male  
Female 
Male 
15 
 
15 
 
7 
7 
4 
Founder and medical scientist, 
responsible for overall strategy  
Testing and commercialization of 
medical diagnostics equipment  
New product development  
Medical diagnostics testing  
Creating and testing reagent products 
NanoTech Managing Director 
 
Technical Director 
Male 
 
Male 
9 
 
9 
Co-founder and qualified accountant 
responsible for strategic development 
Co-founder and development scientist 
responsible for nano-particulate 
dispersions and ultra-stable emulsions 
PhotoCat Managing Director 
Technical Director 
Female 
Male 
8 
8 
New business and market 
development 
Founder and scientist responsible for 
developing photo-catalyic water 
treatments 
RadCom Chief Technical Officer  
 
New Technology Manager  
 
Materials Manager  
 
Technical Manager 
Male 
 
Male 
 
Male 
 
Male 
10 
 
13 
 
8 
 
12 
Design and development of new 
radiation detection products 
Co-founder, responsible for pre-
commercial technology development 
Process development and product 
testing 
Overseeing quality control testing 
during detector manufacture 
SensSol Managing Director  
 
Design Engineer 
 
 
R&D Engineer 
Male 
 
Male 
 
 
Male 
11 
 
7 
 
 
5 
Founder, responsible for strategic 
development of gas sensor solutions  
Development of tools for measuring 
ultra-precision electrical parameters 
for gas analyzers and sensors  
New product development  
 
Table 2. Details 
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Company Employees Turnover Sector Company 
Age 
Products/Services Offered 
MediTest 14 £1.2 
million 
Biotechnology 15 years Manufactures a range of in 
vitro diagnostic products to 
detect, prevent, and monitor 
several medical conditions 
related to haemostasis and 
platelet function.  
NanoTech 4 Not 
available 
Nano-technology 9 years Produces customized nano-
particulate dispersions and 
ultra-stable emulsions for use 
in a wide range of industries 
PhotoCat 2 Not 
available 
Photo-catalysis 8 years Provides products and 
solutions based on photo-
catalysis, a hybrid advanced 
oxidation process (AOP) for 
water and wastewater 
treatment 
RadCom 60 £2.4 
million 
Semiconductor 
manufacture 
13 years Design and manufacture of 
radiation detection equipment, 
such as digital color x-rays 
and gamma ray detection and 
imaging 
SensSol 52 £6 
million 
Gas sensors and 
analyzers  
36 years Design and manufacture of 
gas sensors and analyzers in 
various environments, such as 
commercial diving or offshore 
industry 
 
The 16 respondents represented a wide range of managerial experience and expertise. Each 
interview lasted between one and two hours. The collected data were anonymized to ensure 
confidentiality, and each respondent received a synopsis of the research project and signed 
consent forms, confirming their agreement prior to the interview. The recorded interviews were 
transcribed; we then used immersion and crystallization to assess the data. Immersion is a 
reflexive technique to ensure the validity of qualitative data (Borkan, 1999); researchers 
immerse themselves in the data they collect by reading or examining some portion in detail. 
Crystallization (Richardson, 1994) instead is the process of temporarily suspending the process 
of examining or reading the data (immersion) to reflect on the analysis experience and identify 
or articulate patterns or themes noticed during immersion. These complementary processes 
continue until all the data have been examined and the patterns and claims that emerge from 
the data are meaningful and can be well articulated and substantiated. With this 
immersion/crystallization approach, we ensure reflexivity in both the collection and the 
analysis of our study data. 
To ensure rigor, our qualitative research also is guided by the Gioia methodology (Gioia, 
Corley & Hamilton, 2013) and Gnyawali and Song¶s (2016) recommendations regarding rigour 
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in coopetition studies. In particular, we denote the boundary conditions of the coopetition we 
study (i.e., the network and ecosystem) and highlight that the sampled companies are all high-
tech SMEs in a specific region in northern England, with global connections through their 
industrial company±level linkages. Therefore, the boundaries of our study occur at the network 
and ecosystem levels of analysis. With our rich respondent quotes, we illustrate the authenticity 
of our findings and derive a conceptual framework (formative and summative) to establish the 
potential for greater analytic generalizability (Yin, 2013), beyond our local study context.  
4. FINDINGS  
The structure we use to present our findings reflects the time-based conceptual framework in 
Figure 1. With a narrative account, we reveal the impact of time on coopetitive interactions; 
the visual process map in Figure 2 then indicates the motion and flow of coopetitive interactions 
over time. In Table 3 we identify the companies associated with different subphases of Phase 
1. We use the term ³phase´ loosely to refer to motion, even though we do not identify definite 
start or end points to these phases.  
 
Table 3. Companies associated with different subphases of Phase 1  
Progress through Phase 1  A B C D E 
Most closely associated with Phase 1a * *   * 
Most closely associated with Phase 1b   * *  
 
4.1. Phase 1a: Competitive Uncertainty 
Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b) acknowledge the importance of individual-level 
sensemaking in cooperative processes. We identify a key aspect of sensemaking as triggered 
by a cognitive state of competitive uncertainty²a doubt as to the effectiveness of past 
competition based interaction. Past experience can influence future coopetitive interactions 
when the participants contrast ³WKHLURZQFKDQJHGYLHZVRIFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKWKHHVWDEOLVKHG
PLQGVHWRIWKHSDVW´Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b, p. 102). At an individual level, 
such competitive uncertainty often was triggered by disruptive technological developments in 
their networks or ecosystems, for instance, when they fear that competitors are capable of 
outspending them on R&D:  
³We¶ve already talked about [collaboration]. Instead of them investing shed-loads 
of money in doing [R&D] themselves, if you like, we collaborate on it. If it really 
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takes off, we either continue to manufacture for them or they do it themselves.´ 
(Technical Manager, MediTest) 
We associate a key feature of sensemaking in this phase as being reactive at the micro- and 
meso-levels from events at a macro-level. A further motive was triggered at a meso-level, when 
it became apparent that having developed a product, the company lacked resources to exploit 
it. For example, NanoTech required the services of a competitor that understood the technology 
it was trying to develop and could offer testing services to help it commercialize its innovation:  
³We received some money for basically proof of concept. So some of that money 
was used to see whether [our] machine works or not. We wanted to do that on live 
projects rather than just little bits of material, we wanted to get straight into the 
marketplace and work with people [competitors] we know who could provide us 
with a testing service and offer feedback.´ (Managing Director, NanoTech) 
Other companies, such as SensSol, also demonstrated a reactive approach in their use of 
outsourcing if they ODFNHGH[SHUWLVH ³We want to «FDSWXUH WKHLU VNLOOV DQGH[SHUWLVH DQG
FUHDWLYLW\WRWKHEHQHILWRIWKHFRPSDQ\´0DQDJLQJ'LUHFWRUSensSol). Therefore, for these 
technology companies, R&D activity is the first point in the value chain at which competitive 
intent emerges, and occurs in what we call the competitive uncertainty phase. In this phase, the 
rules of competition come into question, and other interaction methods are considered, which 
may or may not include coopetition. The emergence of coopetitive sensemaking in this phase 
emerges due to macro-level stimuli triggering doubt as to the viability of pure competition as 
a sustainable mode of interaction at a micro or meso levels. Individuals (usually senior 
managers) then began to explore coopetition as an option and, as they developed a coopetitive 
mindset, passed their experiences to others in the company. This iterative process of 
sensegiving and sensemaking was greatly enhanced when other actors linked through direct 
network relationships possessed a coopetitive mindset, and where the norms of the broader 
ecosystem actors also possessed a collective coopetitive mindset. This phase merged into phase 
2 when the embryonic development of a coopetitive mindset at a micro and meso-level is 
evident, and which subsequently leads to more proactive exploration of coopetition 
possibilities.  
 
4.2. Phase 1b: Born Coopetitive  
By considering coopetition as an emergent phenomenon, we investigated the origins of a 
coopetitive mindset. In some cases, a coopetitive mindset had developed having passed through 
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the competitive uncertainty phase of sensemaking, but in others, it seemed evident from the 
very birth of the company. Thus, in Figure 2 we separate the early phase of emergent 
coopetition into two facets and highlight a notion of being born coopetitive in this section. In 
general, we identified that a coopetitive mindset increasingly was evident in the studied sectors, 
in response to previous ventures, peer influence, and the less relational ecosystem context of 
the tech sector. Hence, we feel it is possible to speak of a macro-level coopetitive mindset as 
an aggregation of meso and micro level mindsets. 
RadCom, a manufacturer of semi-conductor materials, already had entered an innovation 
network organized by the U.S. government, which funded research by companies involved in 
chemical production. By organizing a forum to bring together competitors that could discuss 
pertinent research, the U.S. government acted as a complementor, through and indirectly 
influenced coopetitive exchanges of companies in the focal industries: 
³I think the [issue of working with] competitors « LVYHU\LQWHUHVWLQJIRUWKH«
industry because it is such a small industry. There is probably only four 
[companies] in the world that [produce these items], and because there is such a 
want for these [products] by the likes of the U.S. government, then something very 
unusual happened in that the U.S. government will organize a forum for people, 
representatives from the different companies to come together and discuss 
technology innovation. Which is kind of unusual, I don¶t know many other 
industries where you would invite, you know [competitors].´ (Materials Manager, 
RadCom) 
If respondents had been involved in similar interactions in previous companies, they tended 
to maintain a coopetitive mindset when entering or founding new ventures, such that they were 
born coopetitive. Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b) cite changes in a macro discourse 
that affects the propensity of actors to engage with coopetition.  
³I¶m loath to re-invent a wheel, I just want.« I will pick the best thing that I have 
seen or I have available in my network, or whatever, or my knowledge, or my past 
knowledge. I¶ll pick that and I¶ll go with that as my route [to market].´ (Materials 
Manager, RadCom)  
In this sense, the mindset can emerge from previous micro-level histories. In the previous 
category (Phase 1a) we define a coopetitive mindset as emerging within the phase; here (Phase 
1b), we define it as evident at the start of the phase. We therefore associate the coopetitive 
 16 
 
mindset of a born coopetitive company with a desire to create new markets by developing and 
extending their innovations: 
³You¶re creating a market, you know, if you make a simpler product. I mean, 
[competitors] will start to do things they perhaps didn¶t do before. They find other 
uses for the product.´ (Technical Manager, RadCom) 
A further aspect of the born coopetitive state comes from PhotoCat, which actively positions 
itself as a general complementor (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) rather than as a competitor. 
Adner (2017) propose the term multilaterality to define a distinction between ecosystems and 
networks in that an ecosystem cannot be simply decomposable to a series of dyadic 
relationships. Complementation in an ecosystem context may therefore be complex and 
indirect rather than relational as in network context.  
³What I¶m saying is that we don¶t want to be seen as competitors. We¶re 
FRPSOHPHQWDU\ WHFKQRORJ\ WR DQ\ RWKHU « WUHDWPHQW WHFKQLTXH.´ (Technical 
Director, PhotoCat) 
In this instance, the born coopetitive company presents itself to other network agents as a 
general complementor. With its coopetitive mindset from its inception, a born coopetitive 
company recognizes the value of both collaboration and competition in its sector. In turn, it 
may avoid the competitive uncertainty associated with Phase 1a, enabling the company to 
engage directly in coopetitive exploration (Phase 2) with larger competitors. As one respondent 
observed:  
³We deliberately set out to aim our product at large multi-national companies that 
might be doing similar processes worldwide. We reduce the barrier, and that¶s the 
model we¶ve adopted.´ (Technical Director, PhotoCat) 
With this evidence of a coopetitive mindset, our teleological assumptions suggest that the 
phases may overlap and coexist, rather than one appearing as the other disappears (see Figure 
2). The finding of the existence of a born coopetitive company is tentative; such a phase would, 
however, seem significant for consideration of coopetition as an emergent property. We 
identify here that a born coopetitive company is new at the level of the organization (meso), 
but whose staff at the individual level have coopetitive histories, and which are embedded with 
macro-level networks and ecosystems, in which these individuals have histories. Hence, 
consideration of levels of emergence seems essential to understanding a born coopetitive 
company. However, work remains to be done to chase an individual level coopetitive mindset 
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to its embryonic origins, which may be linked to studies of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997).  
4.3. Phase 2: Coopetitive Exploration 
At the beginning of Phase 2, companies possess a coopetitive mindset at least at an individual 
level but also we found, at a meso level. Individuals and companies here are inclined to explore 
coopetition proactively as a potential strategy and a coopetitive mindset helped them to 
proactively make sense of coopetitive opportunities. This quality became evident to many 
companies initially because they shared R&D or new product development activities with 
larger competitors. It thus offered a means make sense of competitive asymmetries while 
initiating coopetition and identify the value in such arrangements. Phase 2 denotes SMEs 
entering a period of coopetitive exploration in which, over time, they identified important 
potential exchange partners and established tentative beneficial exchange relationships.  
The interviews offer evidence that among those companies, which developed a coopetitive 
mindset during Phase 1 (rather than possessing it when entering Phase 1), they turned to their 
old networks first when seeking potential collaborators, which included competitors. Several 
respondents accordingly noted the importance of old networks, and the influence of former 
employee networks. This impact of former employees in old networks has been insufficiently 
studied (Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010) and, to our knowledge, escaped consideration in 
coopetition literature. In our sample, coopetitive mindset emerged from the personal 
relationships that the Technical Director of NanoTech had built and maintained with an old 
network of ex-colleagues. Ties with former colleagues, who often worked in competitor 
organizations, were considered easy to leverage because the connection already existed as 
³low-hanging fruit,´RUan easy-to-reach source of external knowledge:  
³I hate to use the word low-hanging fruit, but we had personal contacts even from 
previous lives with [other] companies.´ (Technical Director, NanoTech) 
However, an issue arises with regard to the existence of a non-coopetitive mindset, as 
ensconced within the prevailing norms of the old network. Existing networks with non-
coopetitive traditions constrain coopetition, and limits also arise when companies in existing 
networks are the only option for collaborative partnerships. At the dyad level, in relationships 
between old colleagues, a process of sensemaking and sensegiving was evident to establish a 
coopetitive mindset at the level of the dyad (meso). At a more macro level, the effect of 
multilateral external complementors (e.g., the U.S. government) introduced new potential 
coopetitive exchange partners into the ecosystem and also had a disruptive influence on non-
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coopetitive mindsets. In this respect, the ecosystem concept may be more appropriate than the 
more relational notion of a network. This phase accordingly was experienced differently in 
terms of when the actors develop a coopetitive mindset (in Phase 1a or 1b). The tensions here 
seem different in this phase relative to the development of this a coopetitive mindset.  
In contrast with the reliance on old networks, participation in an ecosystem in which the 
U.S. government was central was recognized by those companies that had progressed through 
Phase 1a as a potential source of funding for their R&D activity, but also as a source of tension, 
because it compelled working with competitors with which there was no history at the micro 
or meso-levels.. With the intervention of this influential complementor, RadCom needed to 
protect its competitive advantage, based on intellectual property (IP) and be guarded in its 
coopetition within the network, which represented a very small industry: 
³It¶ll be the game of chess that we play often, when you¶re working with these 
people, you¶re letting sufficient out, but keeping certain, you know? It¶s like telling 
people what you¶re going to do, but not how, isn¶t it? That¶s the trick.´ (Materials 
Manager, RadCom) 
Tensions between knowledge leakage and transfer similarly have received some attention, 
especially in terms of how they might be handled through forms of ambidexterity (Fernandez 
& Chiambaretto, 2016; Yang et al., 2014). Ambidexterity thus was a significant mediator of 
coopetitive tensions at the individual actor level, particularly when the participants were not 
former colleagues. Supporting separation involved managing tensions within the SMEs and 
integrating tensions between individuals. Nevertheless, most companies in the sample were 
aware that they needed to be careful when building collaborative relationships with ex-
colleagues who currently worked for competitors; the competition persisted, because they had 
to protect their intellectual property rights.  
Therefore, the focus in this stage is on value creation, concomitant with attempts to protect 
value-capture mechanisms. Science-based companies that develop new innovations have a 
high degree of appropriability from their patents and tacit know-how, which they need to 
protect. A trigger point for the exploration of coopetitive options thus occurred after the 
sampled companies achieved intellectual protection. In these instances, the need for skillful 
ambidexterity also decreased significantly.  
If the collaborative benefits were not reciprocal, the SMEs in our sample reported the private 
competitive benefit of being able to gauge the size of the contracts and types of work their 
competitors could achieve. However, even when the SMEs acknowledged the importance of 
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reciprocity, they did not always recognize its mutual public value in terms of building network 
strength. Therefore, this stage of coopetition is a point before a reciprocal dyadic or tangible 
value exchange takes place. We also note some distinctions in the exploration stage related to 
two born coopetitive companies: PhotoCat positioned itself as a general complementor rather 
than a competitor, and RadCom¶s external complementor (U.S. government) introduced new 
potential coopetitive exchange partners into the ecosystem. 
4.4. Phase 3: Coopetitive Exploitation  
The functioning stage of coopetitive exploitation primarily occurs when private collaborative 
and competitive benefits are reciprocally (rather than unilaterally) obtained and coopetition 
occurs simultaneously. Indeed, reciprocation of benefits as a factor for establishing coopetition 
previously has been studied by Czakon (2009). To analyze how this phase unfolds, relative to 
the emergent properties of coopetitive sensemaking, we examine how tensions emerge, as well 
as how actors make sense of coopetition relative to the previous subphases identified in Table 
3.   
4.4.1. Phase 3 for companies passing through Phase 1a 
Where a coopetitive mindset developed during Phase 1a, trust occurred at the individual 
(micro) level, often between participants with a shared history. Therefore, trust was evident 
between individuals engaged in coopetitive exploitation. NanoTech, a single product company, 
similarly developed its initial innovation in collaboration with a larger company, one of its 
closest competitors: 
³We basically developed the [innovation] in conjunction with [company] that 
would potentially become our main competitor. They are hot on developing the 
technology while we are really hot on the marketplace and what¶s out there. It¶s an 
excellent fit together. The intellectual property is going to be shared.´ (Technical 
Director, NanoTech) 
Thus for NanoTech, sharing development costs and creating shared intellectual property 
with a competitor helped it compensate for its own limited resource base. Through their 
individual-level relationships, participants managed to achieve ambidexterity and collaborate 
and compete simultaneously in a situation marked by significant asymmetries:  
³We are actually competing [with] the technology that they¶ve developed 
themselves, which is directly competing with what we¶re doing. But still we¶ve 
kept that separate. And some things have replaced their other technologies in the 
long-term.´ (Technical Director, NanoTech) 
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The trust developed among actors from an old network at an individual level somewhat 
negated the principle of separation, allowing for the effective management of tensions both 
within the sampled companies (meso) and across individuals (micro).  
MediTest also progressed through Phase 1a and entered into a coopetitive interaction with 
a university that wanted to scale up the results of its R&D activity and develop a new product 
for a spin-out company that would produce medical products. It sought assistance from 
MediTest, a potential competitor in the specific medical market that manufactured similar 
products, to provide manufacturing expertise and help commercialize the innovation: 
³We¶ve built a close relationship with [University]. They came to us, they had 
ideas, and they came to us because they wanted us to manufacture a product for a 
spin-out company they¶ve developed.´ (R&D Manager, MediTest) 
MediTest was drawn into the arrangement by the university; its coopetitive involvement 
thus was reactive. They provided manufacturing expertise on an ad hoc basis to the university, 
in the hope that it would become the preferred manufacturer and eventually a supplier to the 
university¶s purported spin-out company. In effect, it hoped to be a future collaborator and 
future competitor in the market. This approach seems consistent with the term used by Ansari 
et al. (2016) of intertemporal coopetition, and we extend the term here to denote intertemporal 
sensemaking as a key facet of a mature coopetitive mindset. The university¶s scientists called 
on MediTest¶Vexpertise when they needed it: 
³We¶re actually helping develop some products for [University]. They had some 
ideas and that needed someone to follow on up through it with the projects, you 
know? They just call on us when they need us.´ (Technical Manager, MediTest) 
In this ad hoc arrangement, familiarity helps attenuate other, more contractual forms of 
governance. In this sense, intertemporal sensemaking seems to be facilitated by historical 
network relationships. Significantly, a proposed spin-out company would be a potential 
competitor for MediTest¶Vown range of original equipment products. The Managing Director 
had planned on manufacturing and selling its own branded products rather than manufacturing 
products on behalf of other companies. But this coopetitive exploitation arrangement emerged 
because MediTest sold its capabilities as a contract manufacturer, developing products on 
behalf of its potential future competitor. In this sense, the manager mitigated a risk of a 
disruptive force in the ecosystem. The success of this approach largely can be attributed to the 
Managing Director, who communicated effectively and had built strong social relationships 
during Phase 1a. In turn, he was able to navigate coopetitive tensions successfully, overcoming 
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the challenges of separation through the skillful use of ambidexterity mixed with intertemporal 
sensemaking during coopetitive exploitation. Furthermore, the spin-off was likely to be born 
with a coopetitive mindset, adding a new trajectory to the process map in Figure 1: A born 
coopetitive mindset might emerge from the culture of the companies from which the company 
spins off.  
In some cases, advice provided the means to engage in network building with competitors. 
The Managing Director of MediTest, a prolific networker, regularly visited customers, sharing 
his expertise, among other things. As one respondent explained:  
³He was willing to provide advice on the use of competitors¶ products and used 
these visits as opportunities to build personal relationships with existing and 
potential customers, sharing his expertise in the area of Warfarin management.´ 
(Technical Manager, MediTest)  
Through this unilaterally giving approach, the Managing Director delivered a private 
collaborative benefit to competitors, while simultaneously generating a private competitive 
benefit for MediTest, a phenomenon we label non-collaborative competitor benefit. With his 
preexisting relationships, the Managing Director felt confident that reciprocity would come 
later. The presence of trust, earned earlier in the process, held significant importance in these 
interactions.  
For SensSol though, what started as an outsourcing relationship soon developed into a more 
coopetitive relationship, based on a reciprocal dyadic or tangible value exchange:  
³The guy who works for [Company Q], he¶s got a lot of good experience in product 
development so we try and get something back a little bit in terms of how we can 
develop our products, sort of innovating through ideas generation.´ (Design 
Engineer, SensSol)  
The Managing Director, displaying network sensitivity, thus explains how SensSol pooled 
its existing knowledge in cooperation with Company Q to provide a solution for one customer:  
³We¶re doing a lot of work with [Company Q for] a company that puts space craft 
into space «VRWKH\ZDQWWRSUHVHUYHOLIH «and there¶s all sorts of things can 
happen on a space craft «so we used our existing knowledge to come up with a 
solution for them.´ (Managing Director, SensSol). 
SensSol initially displayed a reactive approach in this arrangement with Company Q. 
However, we also find a notable propensity of companies that had undertaken their first 
successful coopetitive interaction to look actively for more of them. As a result of the success 
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of its early (reactive) coopetitive exchange, SensSol subsequently adopted a more proactive 
approach to coopetition. For example, rather than just seeking to protect its intellectual 
property, it formulated a more strategic approach to new product development and introduced 
an innovation program that would enable it to set more formal coopetitive arrangements, 
similar to those with Company Q:  
³We¶re trying to think beyond what we do currently « our innovation program is 
coming in as «we want to try and work with the competition «to find markets 
where we can use our skills and expertise to «open up new markets.´ (Design 
Engineer, SensSol) 
The innovation program involved here was perceived in a network and ecosystem context, 
again suggested a mature coopetitive mindset was open to collaboration with known 
competitors in the existing network. During the early phases, some companies (i.e., A, B, and 
E) found it challenging to develop a coopetitive mindset. Other companies that were born 
coopetitive (i.e., C and D) were able to establish and maintain a coopetitive mind-set when 
entering and/or founding new ventures. For example, RadCom was a spin-out from a university; 
it was very focused on R&D and maintained a sustained period of mutual engagement with its 
source university, such that the two organizations worked closely together in cooperation. 
Through this sustained complementary relationship, RadCom also gained a private competitive 
benefit, through access to the university¶s network of partner organizations. 
4.4.2. Phase 3 for companies passing through Phase 1b 
In two companies, C and D, we recognize the characteristics of being born coopetitive. 
Coopetition emerges from outsourcing activities with competitors; some SMEs also participate 
in competitor networks. PhotoCat, which is located in an innovation center, proactively 
participated in networking events with competitors organized by that center, through an 
innovation forum that encouraged knowledge-sharing activities, idea exchanges, and informal 
relationships. These interactions were often informal and enabled PhotoCat to take a 
coopetitive stance, working with broader multilateral actors outside the networks of its mangers 
from its foundation. Put another way, managers in this type of company are able to make sense 
of an emergent ecosystem context as well as the historically familiar former networks. Key in 
this facility is to identify opportunities to emerge during interaction, rather than having a clear 
opportunity to exploit before interaction is entered into.  
³It is quite informal, and I think the idea is that companies know what other 
companies are capable of. So, if they come across something that they cannot 
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manage with one of their clients, they say µah!¶ and then [they] start talking, 
potentially either swapping ideas, or working together, to provide a solution, 
because at the end of the day, the customer doesn¶t care who¶s doing the work as 
long as it¶s done.´ (Technical Director, PhotoCat) 
What we therefore note from these accounts is a characteristic of born coopetitive 
companies, namely, ecosystem sensitivity, which contrasts with the network sensitivity among 
those companies that developed a coopetitive mindset in Phase 1. That is, companies with 
ecosystem sensitivity demonstrate a more proactive approach to interaction and location 
decisions.  
RadCom had gained their first commercial contract through the US Government forum, as 
WKH&KLHI7HFKQLFDO2IILFHUFRQILUPHG³We¶ve got out first large research contract with the 
American government ± WRJURZPDWHULDOVIRUWKHP´:HWKHUHIRUHLGHQWLI\RadCom having a 
coopetitive mindset from inception through its proactive pursuit of the US government 
contract:  
³After maybe a year, or a year and a half of knocking on the US Government¶s 
door, because they are one of the key people who pull this type of technology, we 
opened up a funding contract with them and that¶s been the backbone of our 
materials development technology in the last two and a half years.´ (Chief 
Technical Officer, RadCom) 
We further identify a coopetitive mindset in RadCom through its willingness to work 
cooperatively with competitors involved in the US Government forum:  
³You know [competitors] are going to be working on it, you don¶t necessarily know 
KRZPDQ\«EXW\RXNQRZWKDW³alright, I¶ve got this technology that could be used 
for that´, let¶s see if we can use this to get into the market.´ (Chief Technical 
Officer, RadCom)  
RadCom also made its location decision to link to the source university¶s network of 
partners, which provided it access to specialist equipment, as well as sources of expertise: 
³We spent the first year or so still using the [University] facilities and were very 
much part of their physics department. So we¶d use the mechanical workshop there 
to get parts made up that we required and we still use the network there quite a lot 
to source expertise.´ (Chief Technical Officer, RadCom) 
In addition to this proactive effort to access partner organizations, RadCom helped 
commercialize the university¶s basic R&D, which gave it access to those R&D results: 
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³[The university] had other separately funded programs to work on growth, and we 
obviously help them «DQG,PHDQZHKDYHDFFHVVWRWKHLULQIRUPDWLRQUHVXOWVDQG
things.´ (New Technology Manager, RadCom) 
By considering sensemaking during coopetitive exploitation phases, we have identified 
different mechanisms through which companies that developed a coopetitive mindset during 
phase 1 and those we denote as born coopetitive make sense of active coopetition. The former 
maintain greater network sensitivity, the latter more ecosystem sensitivity, meaning they are 
more willing to allow coopetitive opportunities to emerge through interaction with previously 
unconnected actors in the ecosystem. A further key sensemaking assets is intertemporal 
sensemaking, allowing smaller first to invest in coopetition relationships without the immediate 
expectation of reciprocation. However, this phase may eventually lead to coopetitive 
uncertainty and a move again to a different mechanism of collaboration and competition, which 
we discuss next.  
4.5. Phases 4a and 4b: Coopetition versus Competition  
All our companies remained in a state of coopetition during the study. However, apparent in 
the accounts were discussions of what we have called coopetitive uncertainty. This facet of 
sensemaking allowed us to consider an µafter¶ coopetition phase, although we stress these are 
detectable as future loaded projections at the time of the study. 
Our research revealed the propensity of ecosystem sensitive companies, such as C and D, to 
exploit their initial coopetitive interactions in external competitor networks and actively seek 
to multiply their coopetitive relationships on the basis of that initial period of sensemaking. 
PhotoCat had not yet entered into a formal coopetitive agreement. For PhotoCat, its innovation 
was a complementary technology; it was becoming increasingly proactive in its approach to 
seeking coopetition partners: 
³We¶re looking for somebody that would be interested to develop joint IP, either 
in the actual format, the physical form of the catalyst material, or in the chemical 
composition because of certain doping you might get quite radically-improved 
performance, so we¶d be looking at all of that.´ (Technical Director, PhotoCat) 
For RadCom, which was a born coopetitive in our view, considerations of partnering with a 
competitor also involved the potential for acquisitions: 
³We occupy a pretty broad range in the supply chain so « ZH FRXOG DFTXLUH
anywhere in the supply and it would be complementary. That is different to a lot 
of [competitor] businesses that «PLJKWQRWKDYHDSUHsence everywhere in the 
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supply chain, so it might be much more difficult for them to make an acquisition 
«and have it make logical sense. Whereas «we can really make an acquisition 
anywhere in the supply chain if it¶s a sensible acquisition.´ (Chief Technical 
Officer, RadCom) 
In contrast, network-sensitive companies, such as MediTest and NanoTech, adopted a more 
reactive approach. NanoTech sought to share future development costs with a competitor in a 
formal coopetitive relationship to compensate for its limited resource base³:H¶ll share some 
of the costs but either way we¶ll [have] helped each other save money through that joint 
GHYHORSPHQW´ (Technical Director, NanoTech). Beyond cost savings, attempts to formally 
collaborate with competitors were linked to necessity. NanoTech needed to acquire the services 
of a competitor to help it commercialize its innovation; SensSol had introduced its own 
innovation program, so it could establish formal collaborative arrangements with competitors. 
Following an initially reactive, early coopetitive exchange, SensSol subsequently implemented 
a more proactive approach: 
³We were just ticking along a little bit in terms of products we sell «and [our] 
innovation program highlighted the need for us to be innovating «building formal 
relationships in order to grow; otherwise we were going to sort of stagnate.´ (R&D 
Engineer, SensSol) 
Thus, with regard to the impact of coopetitive functioning during the exploitation stage, an 
SMEs¶ ability to pursue formal interfirm coopetition, we find that ecosystem sensitive, born 
coopetitive companies (companies PhotoCat and RadCom) were more proactive in their pursuit 
of formal coopetitive relationships. Network sensitive companies (Companies MediTest, 
NanoTech, and SenSol) instead were more reactive. In Table 4, we summarize some key 
emergent properties of coopetition that we have identified with these cases, which we also link 
to Phases 1 and 2. By advancing these properties, we can better understand how they affect the 
functioning of coopetition.  
 
Table 4. Key emergent properties of coopetition 
Phase 1a Phase 1b 
Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case 
Reactive 
sensemaking 
Macro-
meso-micro 
MediTest  
NanoTech  
SensSol 
Proactive 
sensemaking 
Micro-
meso-
macro 
PhotoCat  
RadCom  
Competitive 
uncertainty 
Micro and/or 
meso 
MediTest NanoTech 
SensSol  
Born coopetitive Meso PhotoCat  
RadCom  
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Fear of 
disruptive 
innovation 
Macro-micro MediTest Coopetitive 
mindset evident 
Micro 
and 
Meso 
PhotoCat 
RadCom  
Resource 
constraints 
Meso NanoTech Ecosystem and 
network history 
Macro-
micro 
NanoTech 
 
Phase 2 Phase 3 
Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case 
Networked 
sensemaking 
Macro 
(network)-
meso-micro 
NanoTech  Network 
sensitivity 
(companies 
passing through 
1a) 
Micro 
and meso 
MediTest 
NanoTech  
SensSol  
Network 
sensegiving 
Micro-meso-
macro 
(network) 
RadCom  Ecosystem 
sensitivity  
(companies 
passing through 
1b) 
Micro 
and meso 
PhotoCat  
RadCom  
Former 
colleague 
dyads 
Meso-meso NanoTech  Intertemporal 
sensemaking  
Micro MediTest 
General 
complementor 
Meso 
(ecosystem) 
PhotoCat  Exploitative 
ambidexterity 
Meso PhotoCat  
Protected 
advantage 
heightens 
coopetitive 
opportunity 
exploration 
Meso-Macro 
(network 
and 
ecosystem) 
 
 
RadCom  Coopetitive 
uncertainty 
Meso PhotoCat  
Development 
of 
ambidexterity 
to manage 
emerging 
tensions  
Micro  MediTest    
 
Table 4 provides a key summary of the main features we identify in our narrative, the levels 
at which we identify that effect at play and the cases in which we identified them. Given that 
Phase 4 was projected, we do not provide granular details of this phase. Further, applying our 
initial conceptual framework (Figure 1) to our findings, we obtain a visual process map of 
emergent coopetition (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Visual process map of emergent coopetition  
The process map (Fig. 2) challenges the assumptions of previous work suggesting that 
coopetition is a linear flow from emergent to deliberate coopetition. With this summative map, 
we attempt to inculcate the notion of equifinality (Von Bertalanffy, 1968) and recognize the 
different available routes to undefined points in the future. In Phase 1 we identify two 
subphases (competitive uncertainty and born coopetitive) in relation to the development of 
coopetitive mindset. These phases are experienced differently, in terms of when the actors 
develop a coopetitive mindset (either Phase 1a or 1b). With our loose definition of phases, we 
visualize Phase 2 as an iterative loop that may lead back to coopetitive uncertainty several 
times, and we posit that the Phase 3 exploitation still entails ongoing exploration. We note a 
state of coopetitive uncertainty in Phase 3 that allows us to posit an µafter¶ coopetition phase. 
In the projected phase 4 companies either move from a functioning state of coopetitive 
exploitation toward a more formal coopetitive relationship, or return to a state of competition.  
5. DISCUSSION  
We conclude with a summary of our main findings and their contributions to current theory on 
coopetition. We also cite some practical implications, limitations, and research directions.  
We have advanced understanding of how the historical legacy of interaction affects 
coopetitive exploitation. Our intent has been to explore the impact of time on coopetitive 
interaction, rather than just explore coopetition over time; that is, we seek to expose emergence. 
With this early attempt to explore empirically the emergence of a coopetitive mindset, we 
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identify a Phase 1 of coopetition, in which consideration of a coopetitive mindset is pertinent. 
It consists of two forms. In one, a coopetitive mindset emerges from a sense of doubt about 
whether competition is the most effective form of business development, or what we call a 
competitive uncertainty phase. Companies passing through this phase tend to have reactive 
motives, in response to competitive moves or broad network trends. The second observed state 
is what we call a born coopetitive; to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use this 
term.  
Figure 2 acknowledges some of the doubt about the emergence of a coopetitive mindset, but 
in at least one case, we are confident that a spin-off truly was born coopetitive. In this sense, 
historical factors may underpin a coopetitive mindset. However, there is even more to learn 
from this finding, such that we also define a stage of coopetitive exploration, during which the 
company iteratively explores opportunities for value co-creation and value capture. We 
consider it essential to present this phase as multi-directional, in that it appears reversible, 
interruptible, and greatly accelerated, in no particular linear order. A process model based on 
teleological assumptions therefore seems most appropriate. We further note that non±born 
coopetitive companies seem to progress more cautiously through Phase 2, whereas the born 
coopetitive companies make rapid progression through Phase 2 (perhaps even skipping it). The 
born coopetitive companies also seem highly proactive when seeking locations close to 
possible complementors (that initially were strangers), whereas non±born coopetitive 
companies rely more on old networks and former colleagues when exploring coopetitive 
arrangements. The norms of these networks may constrain the development of coopetitive 
norms.  
In Phase 3 (coopetitive exploitation), companies are able to use the trust built through their 
historical establishment of coopetitive norms at an individual level. In contrast, the born 
coopetitive companies have more of a ³blind-faith´ approach to coopetition; having progressed 
rapidly through Phase 2, they have somewhat more difficulty managing tensions at an 
individual level, in that they have not gone through the laborious but valuable trust-building 
and norm-developing process. We refer to these two approaches as network sensitivity versus 
ecosystem sensitivity. Both signal distinct sensemaking approaches, and they offer different 
value in distinct phases. Ecosystem sensitivity offers the potential to make rapid progress 
toward coopetitive exploitation at the company level, but it suffers more tensions at the 
individual level due to the lack of interpersonal norms.  
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6. CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This article offers a theoretical contribution to the contextual approach to coopetition. In 
presenting our findings, we make a processual contribution, which is both emergent and 
teleological in its underlying assumptions. We add to the small body of empirical work that 
explores coopetition as an emergent property (Dahl, 2014). Unlike previously available 
expositions of coopetition over time (Tidström & Rajala, 2016), we address the impact of a 
history of coopetitive exploitation. Taking a lead from Tidström and Rajala (2016), we detail 
how these historical legacies exert effects at different levels of interaction (i.e., individual, 
company, network, and ecosystem). Our findings are response to the call to apply a 
sensemaking approach to coopetition research (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). We add 
considerably to an understanding how a coopetitive mindset effects the emergence of 
coopetition and we particularly answer calls for multi-level insights into both sensemaking and 
emergent perspectives on coopetition.   
6.1. Managerial Implications  
There are several managerial implications that derive from our findings. First, our findings 
allow managers to better understand the context of emergent coopetition. However, given that 
our findings involve the study of emergence ± matters that could not be predicted before their 
manifestation, it is difficult to propose that the findings sensemaking can be useful to those 
developing a coopetitive mindset. However, the principle of sensegiving is a more useful 
concept in a contextual reading. Networks often have focal companies and ecosystems have 
lead companies and platform owners. For individuals with a coopetitive mindset in companies 
embedded in networks and ecosystems with actors which predominantly have a non-
coopetitive mindset, the principle of sensegiving should be seen as a form of persuasion best 
achieved through different levels, from individual to company, through to network and 
ecosystem levels. Second, those with a coopetitive mindset can better communicate the benefits 
at different levels of analysis and advise of the way that the coopetitive tensions can be 
managed with their company, for instance through the principle of separation. Third, the notion 
of a born coopetitive company is a useful concept for companies in tech sectors. One feature 
of a successful spin-off is that the potential new company has a collective coopetitive mindset, 
and this should be used as a means of assessing their potential µfitness¶ for survival in 
coopetitive networks and ecosystems. Fourth a caution we offer is the over reliance of old 
networks and an under sensitivity to ecosystems. A mature coopetitive mindset seems to 
involve a need to be willing to allow coopetitive opportunities to emerge through interaction 
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with actors between which there is no history. Fifth, small companies engaging in coopetition 
should in particular be aware of intertemporal sensemaking ± giving out value without 
immediate expectation of reciprocity.  
6.2. Limitations and Further Research 
The main limitation of this research is its focus on a single network context. Examining 
additional cases in different spatial and cultural contexts would add depth to the assertions 
advanced herein. We also call for a deeper understanding of coopetitive mindsets and how they 
emerge, potentially as flows across different levels (e.g., individual to group, to and from 
networks). Such an exploration might take a dynamic capability perspective. In our framework, 
we project anticipated next moves, from the perspective of companies engaged in coopetitive 
exploitation. Further research could retrospectively examine a post-coopetitive phase and its 
links to earlier phases. We also anticipate additional coopetitive uncertainty between our 
Phases 3 and 4, but we could not establish this sub-phase with our data, because all our study 
cases remained in the coopetitive exploration phase. Further research could also extend the 
ecosystem context to platforms. Increasingly, coopetition and open innovation initiatives are 
clustered around platform leaders, rather than just being spatially co-located. The emergence 
of coopetitive mindset in platform contexts represents an urgent topic for research.  
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